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As a major cause of company’s development and an important foundation for 
growth of future cash flow, companies’ investment will directly affect the company’s 
financial decisions and dividends. However, inefficient investment behaviors of 
enterprises will lead to harmful economic fluctuations and waste of resources. China’s 
listed firms are under the strong control of larger shareholders, while larger 
shareholders have enough control right to establish the investment decision to meet 
their own benefits. Under these conditions, the investment behaviors are distorted 
heavily in some degree, and a large amount of inefficient investment behaviors exist.  
The main empirical tests in this thesis employ financial statement data in listed 
companies of China from 2004 to 2006. We study the over-investment in firm level 
with the special consideration of the institutional backgrounds in China. The main 
questions in this thesis are: First, what is the true motive that results in the high 
sensitivity on invest and free cash flow? Second, whether the divergence between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the firm’s ultimate controller will aggravate the 
degree of over-investment? Third, discuss the effect of related corporate governance 
factors on over-investment behaviors caused by agency problems between large 
shareholders and small shareholders. 
The studies through a series of empirical analyses suggest: (1) In listed 
companies of China, agency costs of free cash flow bring on high sensitivity on invest 
and free cash flow; (2) The sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its cash flow increases 
as the degree of the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
firm’s ultimate controller increases; (3) The increase of cash-flow rights of the firm’s 
ultimate controller will ease the over-investment of the firm. As for the restrictive 
effect of corporate governance on companies’ overinvestment, the restriction of other 
shareholders to the controlling shareholders and the independent directors’ function is 
effective, and the institution shareholders don’t work. 
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假设公司的 终控制人采用的控股层次为 N， 终控制人控制 A公司，控股
比例为 C1，同时公司控股 B 公司，控股比例为 C2，B 公司又控股 C 公司，控股
比例为 C3，……，直至控制 Z 公司，控股比例为 CN。假设 CI≥0.5，即中间控
股层都达到绝对控股，那么处于控股结构顶端的 终控制人对这 N 家公司都拥
有合法的控制权。 终控制人对 Z 公司拥有的控制权（表决权）为 C=min（C1 ，
C2…， CN），但拥有的所有权（现金流量权）则小于控制权，具体计算为：现金
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